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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890617-CA
Priority No. 2

MARK DERON HARRISON,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
This petition for rehearing discusses two of the five
issues addressed in the Harrison opinion—the marital privilege
issue and the Batson issue.1

Relevant portions of the opinion are

attached as Appendix 1.
The primary reason that this Court should grant rehearing
is that this Court's application of harmless error analysis in these
two contexts goes beyond mere tolerance to actual encouragement of
blatant prosecutorial misconduct.

In contravention of governing

law, the opinion repeatedly informs prosecutors that their duty to
uphold the Utah and United States Constitutions2 is inversely
proportionate to the quantity of evidence available to support a
conviction.

1. See Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining
circumstances allowing rehearing); Cumminas v. Nielson. 129 P. 619
(Utah 1913)(same).
2. E.g. Utah attorney oath of office and Utah Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.8, in Appendix 2 to this petition; Walker v.
State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981).

ARGUMENT
I.
AN EVIDENCE-BASED3 HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
DOES NOT APPLY TO A PROSECUTORS VIOLATION
OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE.
As conceded by the State and noted in the Harrison opinion,
the prosecutor violated Mr. Harrison/s marital privilege, a right
explicitly protected by the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code.
Id. at 26-30 and n. 32.
In apparent disregard of Utah law directly on point with
this prosecutorial marital privilege violation case, this Court
concluded that the evidence-based harmless error analysis applied to
generic prosecutorial misconduct applies in this case:
We consider the two part Valdez test to effectively
supersede Brown. In Brown, appellant's rape conviction was
reversed because of improper prosecutor comments on
defendant's marital privilege without consideration of whether
those comments were actually prejudicial and, indeed, despite
the fact that the evidence in the case supported the
conviction. The absence of a prejudice analysis in Brown was
later criticized. See State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502
P.2d 113, 115 (1971)(Ellett, J., concurring). Part two of the
Valdez analysis addresses the prejudice issue overlooked in
Brown.
Harrison at 28 n. 33.
In Brown, the court did not "overlook" the concept of
prejudice, but noted the diverse approaches to prejudice in the
context of prosecutorial comment on the marital privilege.

State v.

3. By "evidence-based," Mr. Harrison refers to the Valdez
test evaluating prosecutorial misconduct in light of the quantum of
evidence properly admitted in support of a verdict of guilt, which
is distinguished below from the prejudice analysis traditionally
applied in cases involving prosecutorial violation of the marital
privilege, which prejudice analysis focuses on the procedural facts
of the case and the impact of the misconduct on the jury and the
exercise of the privilege.
- 2-

Brown, 383 P.2d 930, 932 and n. 3 (Utah 1963).

The court noted that

permission of comment on the privilege largely destroys the
privilege, and reversed the conviction because the prosecutor's
comment to the jury in Brown destroyed the privilege in that case
"and was prejudicial."

Id.

Inasmuch as the Brown court concluded that the comment in
that case was prejudicial, but also found that "the verdict was
supported by substantial evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis
for a finding of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," id.
at 932, Brown contradicts this Court's assumption that an
evidence-based harmless error analysis applies.
State v. Trusty, 502 P.2d 113 (Utah 1972), another case
directly on point with this prosecutorial marital privilege
violation case, cites Brown with approval:
[Brown] was a rape case. The defense was alibi: that
defendant was home with his wife. The wife did not testify.
In his argument to the jury the district attorney pointed out
that the wife was the one person who could have corroborated
the alibi. Under those circumstances we held that the comment
had the effect of destroying or impairing the privilege, and
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In considering the principle stated in the Brown case and
its applicability to the instant situation, we concede the
correctness of these propositions: that any comment by the
prosecutor which in a substantial way will impair or disparage
a claim of privilege is improper and therefore is error; and
that if it be such that there is a possibility that it
prejudiced the defendant, in the sense that there is any
likelihood that there may have been a different result, then
the error should be deemed prejudicial and another trial
granted.
Id. at 114.
Examination of the prejudice analysis of the Trusty court
demonstrates once again that in cases involving prosecutorial
violation of the marital privilege, the focus is not on the evidence
- 3 -

supporting the verdict of guilt, but is on the procedural facts of
the case and the impact of the misconduct on the jury and the
exercise of the privilege.

The Trusty prejudice analysis makes no

mention of evidence of guilt:
In regard to the particular situation here these comments
are pertinent. First, there was no objection upon which the
court could act until after the defendant had answered the
question. The second, if there had been any implication
adverse to the defendant, the trial judge gave an appropriate
cautionary instruction which it should be assumed that
conscientious jurors would follow.
It is appreciated that in certain exigent circumstances
the two foregoing observations might be set aside in order to
rule more fundamentally upon the merits. Nevertheless, we
have mentioned them in this case because they have a bearing
upon and should be considered in connection with what we
regard as the more important and controlling consideration:
whether in surveying the total circumstances it appears that
there is any reasonable likelihood of any substantial
prejudice to the defendant under the rules hereinabove stated.
When the district attorney asked the question under
consideration here: "I assume then, your wife will testify to
the same thing . . .?" before any objection was made, the
defendant stated what the trial court, and this court, should
be able to assume expressed what he intended the court and
jury to believe was his view of the matter when he voiced the
" . . . hope [that] she testifies to the truth . . .," etc. He
still had the choice of calling her as a witness, or of not
calling her, and of having an appropriate instruction thereon
if he so desired. It seems to us that it would be mere
conjecture to presume that a jury would necessarily draw an
inference adverse to the defendant from the occurrence. Also
having an important bearing on this problem is the fact that
the court protected the defendant's right to prevent his wife
from testifying just as effectively as that could be done in
the event of a new trial.
Id. at 115.
This Court, in applying the generic evidence-based harmless
error test set forth in Valdez. found the violation of the marital
privilege harmless in light of evidence supporting the verdict of
guilt, and failed to discuss the procedural posture of the case and
the impact the prosecutor's comment had on the jurors and the
exercise of the privilege.

Harrison at 29-30.
- 4 -

Application of the proper Brown-Trusty prejudice test
demonstrates that the trial court's and prosecutor's violation of
the marital privilege in this case left Mr. Harrison with no
procedural mode of exercising the privilege effectively, destroying
the privilege.

Because Mrs. Harrison was repeatedly identified

sitting in court, and the prosecutor established that Mrs. Harrison
testified at the preliminary hearing but was not able to testify at
trial because Mr. Harrison had married her (M.H. 3-8, 67-69; R. 3;
T. 93, 145, 192, 420, 501, 503-504, 507, 639-640), the jurors were
directly confronted with the upsetting idea that Mr. Harrison was
withholding evidence from them through the exercise of his
constitutional right.

See State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080

(Utah Ct. App. 1989)(referring to the marital privilege, this Court
quoted the United States Supreme Court's opinion, Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), "As Jeremy Bentham observed more than a
century and a half ago, such a privilege goes far beyond making
'every man's house his castle,' and permits a person to convert his
house into 'a den of thieves.'").
The trial court's overruling of defense counsel's objection
to the prosecutor's improper closing argument interpreting the jury
instruction on the marital privilege (T. 639-640) undoubtedly
reinforced the jurors' abhorrence of Mr. Harrison's exercise of his
constitutional right.
While the Trusty court indicated that the intent of a
prosecutor in violating the marital privilege is "not the critical
consideration," id., 502 P.2d at 114 n. 3, this Court should realize
that the intent of the prosecutor is nonetheless a valid
- 5-

consideration.

The privilege violated by the prosecutor is one that

was explicitly invoked by Mr. Harrison and repeatedly discussed in
the circuit and district courts (e.g. M.H. 3-8; 67-69; T. 420, 501,
503-507; R. 3), and it cannot be doubted that the prosecutor was
aware of the constitutional right he violated.
This Court should rehear this issue, and correct the
impression published in the Harrison opinion that as long as
prosecutors have sufficient evidence to support a verdict, they are
free to trample fundamental constitutional rights.

II.
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS DOES NOT APPLY
TO BATSON ERRORS.
In the Harrison opinion, this Court indicated that harmless
error analysis applies to a prosecutor's improper peremptory
challenges, understated that a showing of prejudice is "a difficult
showing to make," and encouraged prosecutors to assert the harmless
error doctrine as a defense to claims of improper jury selection:
Because we have determined that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding no racial discrimination in the State's
peremptory challenges, we do not reach the issue of whether
Harrison was prejudiced by those challenges. However, if we
had found clear error, Harrison's conviction could be affirmed
only by showing that the error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967) (quoted in Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597). This is a
difficult showing to make, and prosecutors who are questioned
in the future about possibly improper peremptory challenges
would do well to consider this in formulating their responses,
making sure that they meet the Batson requirements.

- 6 -

Id. .if 16-1' '.4
While this Court is correct that the "Cantu Ilf opinion
asserts that the Chapman harmless error tloctrine applies in this
context., it; is useful to note that Cantu I is a plurality opinion
which appears to reflect the view of only one justice that harmless
error analysis applies.

Compare State v. Cantu, *}\>v V.Ad 591, 597

(Utah liHS)(opinion of Justice Howe, asserting application of
harmless error analysis) with 750 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1988)(opinions
of Justice Zimmerman, Justice t)urh<im, JucRje Orme, and Justice Hall,
making no mention of application of harmless error analysis)
the Cantu case returned to the supreme court after remand
trial court, HIP supreme court reversed Mr

When
the

Cantu's conviction on

the basis of a prosecutor's improper peremptory challenge, without
analyzing whether the prosecutor's improper peremptory cha] lenge was
prejudicial in I nihil of evidence presented supporting Mr. Cantu's
conviction.

State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989).

4. Similar indications that concepts of harmless error and
prejudice apply in the context of Batson-type challenges can be
found in the opinion, as follows:
Finally, if the State's peremptory challenges were improper,
was such impropriety prejudicial to Harrison?
Id. at 6.
Because Harrison failed to show obvious error, we need
not consider whether he was harmed by the State's use of
peremptory challenges to limit the number of women on the
jury. We seriously doubt, however, that Harrison could
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result
had he been tried by a jury including six or seven women, as
opposed to five.
Id. at 16 n.15.
But see Harrison at 15, n. 13 (in finding that
Mr. Harrison's liberty interest is not at stake, this Court
explained, "The issue, as presented, has more to do with the public
interest in a fair justice system than it does with Harrison's
liberty.")
- 7-

Harmless error analysis does not apply to a prosecutors
improper peremptory challenge because the harm caused by the
improper peremptory challenge is not limited to a defendant's case.
As this Court recognized in Harrison, and as various members of the
United States Supreme Court have recognized in Batson v. Kentucky
476 U.S. 79 (1986)r and in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.

, 110

S.Ct. 803 (1990), the damage caused by a prosecutor's improper
peremptory challenge is not limited to the impact the misconduct has
on the outcome of a defendant's case, but extends to harm the
excluded jurors and the entire justice system.
7-8.

See Harrison at

A defendant voicing a Batson challenge is vested with the

responsibility to vindicate not only his own rights, but also the
rights of the prospective jurors and the proper functioning of the
justice system, id., and should not be saddled with the impossible
burden to show prejudice.

Numerous cases involving Batson claims

and other improper jury selection issues so recognize, and call for
reversal without engaging in harmless error analysis, some
explicitly rejecting harmless error analysis.5
Counsel for Mr. Harrison is unable to find any decisions,
other than Cantu I and Harrison, requiring a prejudice analysis in
the context of Batson-type claims.
The Harrison opinion is without basis in informing
prosecutors that their constitutional duty to refrain from
exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of group bias is
inversely proportionate to the quantity of evidence available to
support a conviction.

5.

For this reason, rehearing is requested.

See cases cited in Appendix 3.
- 8 -

III.
THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATIONS OF EQUAI PROTECTION
REQUIRE REVERSAL.
This Court's Batson analysis contain;-.' additional legal
errors
A.

*

MR

versights that require correction.
-ROVED THE EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS.

This Court correctly noted that under United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 4<>" U.S. - 11 (1983), once the
party accused of discrimination explains the allegedly
discriminatory actions, the adequacy of the prima facie case
normally triggering the obligation to explain the actions is moot.
Harrison at 12. However, this Court was less than clear in
explaining how the ultimate issue of discrimination is to be
resolved once the .-allegedly discriminatory actions have been
explained.

As explained in Aikens, once the explanation of the

actions has been given, there are two separate -approaches to the
ultimate finding of discrimination:

the direct mode of proof

relating to all the facts and circumstances of the case (applied in
the Harrison opinion at page 13), and I ht» indirect mode of proof
focusing on the credibility of the explanation.

In the words of the

Aikens Court,
As we stated in [Texas Department of Community Affairs v.]
Burdine [450 U.S. 248 (1981)]:
"The plaintiff retains the burden of
persuasion . . . .
[H]e may succeed in this either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employees proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence." 450 U.S. at 256, 67 L.Ed.2d 207,
101 S.Ct. 1089.
Aikens at 716.

1. MR. HARRISON PROVED THE EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS INDIRECTLY
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTORS EXPLANATIONS OF THE CHALLENGES WERE NOT
CREDIBLE.
While this Court was correct in noting that "the court was
free to accept as credible the prosecutor's assertion that the
challenges were made in an effort to obtain a gender-balanced
jury[,]" Harrison at 13, this Court still has an obligation to
review the record and determine if the factual finding of the trial
court was clearly erroneous.

State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518

(Utah 1989).
As explained in Mr. Harrison's opening brief at page 16,
and in Mr. Harrison's reply brief at pages 14 and 15, but entirely
omitted from the State's brief and this Court's opinion, the
prosecutor's assertion that he struck jurors Gomez and Rezendez
because he wanted a gender balanced jury is not credible because the
prosecutor, when faced with a prospective juror group with females
in the majority, struck a male with his first peremptory challenge.
Under Aikens, because the prosecutor's explanations of the
peremptory challenges in this case were not credible, Mr. Harrison
proved the Equal Protection violations.
2. MR. HARRISON PROVED THE EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY.
In finding that Mr. Harrison did not carry the burden of
proving the equal protection violations, this Court relied on
Mr. Harrison's perceived failure to present a prima facie case
triggering the prosecutor's obligation to explain the peremptory
challenges.

Harrison at 13. Review of this Court's discussion of

the prima facie case reveals a legal and a factual oversight of how
discrimination is further proved by the record in this case.
- 10 -

I\I

page 1 J

ourt indicated, "Harrison's argument that

the prosecutor's voir dire of the peremptorily challenged jurors was
suspiciously sparse was not made to the t rial < jourt

"

The Batson

decision, however, places the duty of reviewing the voir dire not on
defense counsel, but on the trial court:
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant
circumstances. For example, a "pattern of strikes against
black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise
to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the
prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire
examination and in exercising his challenges may support or
refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples
are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial
judges, experienced in voir dire, will be able to decide if
the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of
discrimination against black jurors.
Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (emphasis added).
As a factual matter, trial counsel did address the issue of
the def icien I ./1 > i i d Ire:
Your Honor, I would indicate that it appears that there
is no significant difference between the persons that Mr. Cope
indicates he was choosing between. As to M s . Rezendez there's
absolutely very little information about her. She's single,
she's into printing, she watches T.V. and reads T.V. Guide and
lives in an area where some other jurors apparently live.
And as to M s . Gomez there was very little information as
well under w h i c h — a n d I think that Mr. Cope's choice of
striking them appears to me to still have a racial overtone
of, these are the people I like the least, I thought would do
the less well for me and I believe that is inappropriate and I
think it denies my defendant an opportunity to have a fair
cross-section of the community represented.

(T. 77). 6

6. Compare Harrison at pages 21-26 (while it was the
State's burden to justify the warrantless search of the Harrison's
diaper bag, after rejecting the trial prosecutor's only
justification (consent), this Court justified the search of the
diaper bag with a "search incident to arrest" theory which the
prosecutor did not assert because he assumed it factually unfounded
(footnote continued)
- 11 -

The prosecutor removed fifty percent of the minority
prospective jurors with peremptory challenges.

The record displays

nothing about these jurors to distinguish them from other jurors who
were not challenged by the prosecutor.
Mr. Harrison's opening brief.

See Appendix 2 to

The prosecutor's explanation that he

struck jurors Gomez and Rezendez because he "liked them the least"
"for whatever reason" is a vague and legally insufficient response
to an allegation of discrimination.

Mr. Harrison is "'entitled to

rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that
permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.,n
Harrison at 7 n. 4, quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96,
quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953).
These circumstances combine to demonstrate Mr. Harrison's
direct proof of the Equal Protection violations.
B. THE PROSECUTOR'S EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE BASIS
OF GENDER IS A VIOLATION OF BATSON AND UTAH LAW THAT SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED ON THE MERITS BY THIS COURT.
Resting on waiver grounds, this Court declined to address
the merits of Mr. Harrison's arguments that the prosecutors
explanation of the peremptory challenges of jurors Gomez and
Rezendez on the basis of the gender violated federal Equal
Protection and Utah law.

Harrison at 13-17 and accompanying

footnotes.

(footnote 6 continued)
(M.H. 57) , and with an "inevitable discovery/babies will be babies11
exception that the State has never asserted as a legal theory and
has never demonstrated as a factual matter); petition for rehearing
in State v. Lorenzo Hubbard, case number 900128-CA (discussing
substantive and procedural burdens of State in justifying
warrantless searches).

1. BATSON PROHIBITS IIIh EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE
BASIS OF GENDER.
As noted in Mi, Harrison's opening brief at pages 17 and
18, and the letter of supplemental authority filed in this Court and
the cases cited therein, peremptory dial lunges exercised on the
basis of gender violate the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by
Batson.

See e.g. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 IKS. 79, 97-98

(1986)(discussing JlJmial n

gioup bias in exercise of

peremptory challenges); United States v. De Gross. 913 F.2d 1417
(9th Cir. 1990)(reversal for gender discrimination in exercise of
peremptory cha J ] enges; relyi in| on Batson but decided under fifth
amendment because case arose in federal court).
This Court's opinion fails to address this contention.
2- UTAH LAW PROHIBITS THE EXERCISE OF PEREMPT* DRY CHALLENGES ON THE
BASIS OF GENDER.
This Court's discussion of the legality of I: tie prosecutor's
alleged

jender-based peremptory challenges focuses on various

exceptions to the waiver doctrine, and appears to indicate that this
Court will not address the merits of an issue nn appeal unless a
plain error occurred, a liberty interest is jeopardized, or
exceptional circumstances exist.

Mr. Harrison is able to make any

of these three threshold *• )mw i uqs, tnd t.his tourt should address the
merits of his argument on rehearing.
a. GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION IS PLAIN ERROR, AND
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE JUSTIFY THIS
COURT'S ADDRESSING THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE.
The pi din language

law prohibits gender

discrimination in jury selection.

Constitution of Utah Article IV,

- 13 -

section 1; Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-3, in Appendix 2 to this
petition.

In Harrison, however, this Court determined that gender

discrimination in jury selection does not qualify as plain error:
In TState v.1 Anderson. [789 P.2d 27 (Utah 1990),] the
Utah Supreme Court declined to consider a constitutional
objection to a criminal sentence that had not been raised in
the trial court, because the claimed error did not satisfy the
"obviousness" requirement for plain error. 789 P.2d at 29.
That is, the alleged error was not one that should have been
recognized by the trial court when it occurred. Id. Here,
given that Harrison's trial Jury had five women, the use of
peremptory challenges to keep additional women from being
seated could not have been obvious error. Nor has it been
determined by Utah courts whether gender-based peremptory
challenges are constitutionally or statutorily impermissible,
Harrison at 15 (footnote and citation omitted, emphasis added).
This reasoning is erroneous.

The violations of

Mr. Harrison's right to be tried by a jury that is selected in a
legal manner, and the violation of the rights of jurors Gomez and
Rezendez to serve on the jury were not obviated by the permission of
service of other female jurors.
The plain language of the Utah Constitution and Code does
not depend on judicial interpretation for validity.
As explained in point II of this petition, because the
prosecutor's discriminatory peremptory challenges damage not only
Mr. Harrison's rights, but also the rights of the stricken jurors
and the fundamental fairness of the justice system, the prejudice
prong traditionally applied in the plain error test cannot apply.
It is highly unlikely that any defendant challenging the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges will ever be able to
show traditional prejudice.

See Harrison at 16-17 and n. 15. Yet

at stake are not only Mr. Harrison's rights, but also the rights of
the jurors and the fairness of the justice system.
- 14 -

These

exceptional circumstances call for a decision on the merits by this
Court.
b. MR. HARRISON'S LIBERTY IS AT STAKE.
Part of the reason this Court declined f
merits

• le on llu-

Harrison's claim that it is illegal t

discriminate in

jury selection on the basis of gender is this Court's view that
Mr. Harrison's liberty interest it- no1 «i'i stake:
In this case, we do not find a liberty interest at stake
because of the remoteness of the gender bias issue to
Harrison's main claim of improper racial motivation. See also
note 15, infra [explaining doubt that Mr. Harrison could show
prejudice]. The issue, as presented, has more to do with the
public interest in a fair justice system than it does with
Harrison's liberty.
Harrison at 15 n. 13.
Inasmuch as i in remedy sought b) Mi

Harrison and granted

in similar cases, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417
(9th Cir. 1990), is reversal of the conviction, Mr. Harr ison' s
liberty is <il strike .mil I his Court should rule on the merits.
State v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah 1983).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Harrison respectfully requests rehearing of this case.
DATED this Js

day of January. 1991.

VER^ICE S .V AH CHING
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

Appellant/Petitioner
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APPENDI

BATSON ISSUE

The jury found Harrison guilty of manslaughter, a lesser
included offense of the second degree murder charge. Harrison
argues on appeal that: (1) the State's peremptory challenges
violated the federal constitution's equal protection clause;
(2) the refusal to allow testimony about the details of prior
threats against him and the refusal to allow the reading of
John Bray's prior testimony to the jury improperly compromised
his defense; (3) the search of the diaper bag violated his
rights against unreasonable search and seizure; (4) various
comments and questions by the prosecutor violated his right to
a fair trial; and (5) the reasonable doubt instruction given to
the jury was improper.
ANALYSIS
I.

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

Harrison argues that the State's peremptory challenges
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution. Analysis of this issue
requires as many as five steps. First, does Harrison, a black,
have standing to raise an equal protection objection to the
exclusion of Hispanics from his jury? Second, was his
objection timely raised before the trial court? Next, if
timely raised, did Harrison establish a prima facie case of
improper discrimination, requiring the State to explain its
peremptory challenges? Fourth, if a prima facie case was
established, was the prosecutor's explanation of the challenges
adequate to support the trial court's finding that there was no
improper racial discrimination? Finally, if the State's
peremptory challenges were improper, was such impropriety
prejudicial to Harrison?
Standing The underpinning for Harrison's argument is Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson set the standards for
determining when a prosecutor's peremptory juror challenges
violate the equal protection clause. Under Batson. a prima
facie case of improper discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges is raised by showing (1) that defendant
is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove members of
defendant's race from the jury panel; and (3) that these facts
and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the
panelists were removed because of their race. 476 U.S. at 96;

see also State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595-97 (Utah 1988)
("CantU I") (explaining fiaiiQn).4
The first two elements of a Batson prima facie case appear
to require racial identity between an accused and peremptorily
stricken jurors, and some courts have held that such identity
is required before a Batson equal protection objection can be
raised.
However, the United States Supreme Court recently
reserved judgment on this issue, in Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 803, 811 & n.3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . b I n fact, four
members of the present Court have indicated their belief that
lack of racial identity should not bar such an objection. Xd.
at 811-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 813-14 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan (now retired) and Blackman, JJ.);
820-22 (Stevens, J,, dissenting).
In his Holland dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that
a criminal defendant, in making a Batson objection to
peremptory challenges, is asserting more than his individual
4. The defendant is also "entitled to rely on the fact, as to
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.•- Batson, 476
U.S. at 96 (quoting Averv v. Georgia. 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
5. SSfi/ e.g. . United States v. Rodriguez-Cardenas, 866 F.2d
390, 392 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Townslev, 856 F.2d
1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. Anoiulo.
847 F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir. 1988), CSJLLU denied,
U.S.
,
109 S.Ct. 314; United States v. Vaccaro. 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th
Cir. 1987). Our review of these cases reveals that their
holdings on this issue are simply based on recitations of
patson's racial identity language, without analysis. We,
however, are wary of standing analyses that are so
-insufficiently sensitive to . . . legitimate policy
considerations." In re J.W.F., 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18
(1990).
6. Holland held that a white defendant did have standing to
object, on sixth amendment -fair cross section- grounds, to the
use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury
that tried him. 110 S.Ct. at 805-06. However, the Court then
held that the fair cross section requirement, applicable to the
venires from which jurors are selected, does not extend to the
use of peremptory challenges in selecting the actual trial jury.

interest in being tried by a jury from which members of his own
race have not been wrongfully excluded. Such a defendant
raises -not only his rights, but also those of the members of
the venire and of the general public." Id. at 813-14
(Marshall, J., dissenting). A Batson objection asserts the
rights of potential jurors to not be excluded from the jury on
account of race, HatiOH/ 4 7 6 U.S. at 87, as well as the
public's interest in preserving confidence in the fairness of
our justice system. Id. Justice Kennedy added, "To bar the
[equal protection] claim whenever the defendant's race is not
the same as the juror's would be to concede that racial
exclusion of citizens from the duty, and honor, of jury service
will be tolerated, or even condoned." Holland, 110 S.Ct. at
811-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The question of whether a defendant who does not share
racial identity with the stricken juror(s) has standing to
raise a Batson equal protection objection to a prosecutor's
peremptory challenges is now pending before the Supreme Court,
in Powers v. Ohio,
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 1109 (Feb. 20, 1990)
(granting certiorari). Holland, however, suggests that in
Powers, the Court will reject racial identity with excluded
jurors as a standing requirement for such objections.
We also note that in the present case, even though
Harrison and the peremptorily excluded jurors are not of the
same race, they do share racial minority status. Like
Harrison, a black man, the excluded jurors, Hispanics or
Hispanic-surnamed people, belong to a racially cognizable group
for purposes of Batson equal protection analysis. Cantu I, 750
P.2d at 596 (citing Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S. 482 (1977),
and Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1153 (Colo. 1987)). The
existence of shared though not identical minority status, plus
the likelihood that racial identity will be rejected as a
prerequisite for raising a Batson objection to the exercise of
peremptory challenges, persuades us that Harrison has standing,
on equal protection grounds, to object to the State's
peremptory challenges in this case.

TimelinessThe State invites us to reject Harrison's objection to the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges because it was not raised
until after the jury was sworn, and was therefore untimely
under section 78-46-16(1) (Supp. 1990) of Utah's Jury Selection
and Service Act. That section states, with our emphasis:

(1) Within seven days after the moving party
discovered, or by the exercise of diligence
could have discovered the grounds therefore
[sic], and in any event before the trial jury
is sworn to try the case, a party may move to
stay the proceedings or to quash an
indictment, or for other appropriate relief,
on the ground of substantial failure to comply
with this act in selecting a grand or trial
jury.
We first note that the State's objection to the
timeliness of Harrison's objection is itself untimely,
appearing nowhere in the record of the trial court
proceedings- More important, however, is the fact that
Harrison's objection was not made under "this act," i.e., the
Jury Selection and Service Act, but was instead based on the
federal constitution.
In State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), our
supreme court noted that constitutional objections to jury
panels fall outside the framework of the Jury Selection and
Service Act. Id. at 574 n.115.
Harrison's objection to the
State's peremptory challenges was constitutionally based, and
therefore was not barred by the time constraint of section
78-46-16(1).
Although not argued by the State nor Harrison, we find
that Utah R. Crim. P. 18 is applicable to Harrison's
constitutionally-grounded objection to the State's peremptory
challenges. Rule 18(c)(2) states that challenges to an
individual juror "may be made only before the jury is sworn to
try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it
to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the
evidence is presented.- While the trial court did not
explicitly find good cause for allowing consideration of the
objection on its merits, it did so implicitly by allowing
counsel to proceed with their arguments. Harrison's objection
7. The Utah Supreme Court's determination was based upon
review of the United States Senate report on the analogous
Federal Jury Selection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (1982). That
report indicated that the federal act's procedures for
objecting to jury selection applied only to alleged violations
of the act and not to constitutional objections. S. Rep. No.
891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967) (quoted in Tillman. 750
P.2d at 574 n.115).

was made and argued immediately after the jury was sworn in,
before the challenged jurors were excused from service, and
before opening statements of counsel. ££• State v. Bankhead,
727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (pre-Tillman case:
constitutional objection to jury selection untimely under
section 78-46-16(1) where not raised until after all evidence
was presented to jury).
Further, Harrison met the requirement of raising and
obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial
court, to preserve it for appeal. Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We find
that Harrison's objection to the peremptory challenges was
timely and therefore proceed to the merits of his argument.
Prima Facie Case.
Setting aside any requirement of racial identity between
a defendant and challenged jurors, a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges is
raised when the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding
the challenges raise the inference that they were used to
exclude potential jurors because of their race. Batson, 476
U.S. at 96; Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597. Once such a prima facie
showing is made, the state must provide a race-neutral
explanation, related to the case being tried, for its
peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. The
explanation must also be clear, reasonably specific, and
legitimate. State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)

("Cantu

11").

Here the State argues that Harrison failed to raise a
prima facie case because he made no showing, beyond the fact
that they had Hispanic surnames, that the stricken jurors were
members of any racial minority. However, our review of the
record reveals that, in an earlier objection to the composition
of the venire from which the jury was selected, the trial court
observed that the jurors in question, along with three others,
did appear to be members of racial minorities. ' We agree with
Harrison that more detailed inquiry into the race of
peremptorily challenged jurors is unnecessary in the context of
8. In denying Harrison's objection that the venire appeared to
underrepresent minorities, the trial court identified five of
the thirty-two venire members as potential minority members.
This identification was based upon appearance and upon surnames.

a Batson equal protection objection, and find that the minority
status of the challenged jurors was adequately established.9
A prima facie showing of the improper use of peremptory
juror challenges requires more than simply showing that one or
more minority jurors were peremptorily stricken, however.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring); Cantu I. 750
P.2d at 597. The Batson Court gave only sparing,
••illustrative" guidance as to what other relevant circumstances
give rise to a prima facie case: "[A] 'pattern' of strikes
against [minority] jurors might give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and
statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his
challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory
purpose." 476 U.S. at 97.
It is doubtful that Harrison showed a pattern of
minority juror strikes here. Two other possible minority
jurors identified earlier by the trial court in fact served on
the trial jury; the fifth minority juror was excused for cause,
a hearing problem. Additionally, Harrison's argument that the
prosecutor's voir dire of the peremptorily challenged jurors
was suspiciously sparse was not made to the trial court. It
appears, therefore, that Harrison did not establish a prima
facie case of improper peremptory juror challenges, and that
the trial court need not have asked the prosecutor to give
race-neutral reasons for the challenges.
The State, however, did not argue to the trial court
that Harrison had failed to make out a prima facie case.
Instead, the prosecutor sought to rebut Harrison's allegation
by giving race-neutral reasons for the questioned peremptory
challenges. The Batson Court indicated that "prima facie
burden of proof rules" developed in cases brought under Title
9. While we are disinclined to find that minority status can
be established solely from one's surname, but see Cantu I. 750
P.2d at 596, we also recognize that a prosecutor bent on racial
discrimination is unlikely to make inquiries to confirm a
juror's suspected minority status before improperly using a
peremptory challenge to exclude the juror. Because Batson and
its progeny seek to prevent the exercise of peremptory
challenges with the intent or purpose to eliminate jurors
solely because of race, it appears to us that concrete proof of
the actual race of the jurors so challenged is, at most, of
secondary importance.

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may apply to the analysis
of peremptory juror challenges, Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18.
In one such case, United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens. 460 U.S. 711 (1983), the Court noted that once a
party accused of improper discrimination attempts to rebut that
accusation with evidence that the challenged action was proper,
the question of whether a prima facie case was made in the
first place "is no longer relevant.- Id. at 715. Instead, the
focus shifts to the ultimate issue of whether improper
discrimination has occurred. I£. at 715-16. Similarly, the
issue of whether Harrison made out a prima facie case of
improper discrimination in the State's peremptory challenges
became irrelevant when the prosecutor failed to contest it at
trial. We therefore proceed to the next step of our analysis,
the question of whether the State adequately rebutted
Harrison's allegation of improper use of peremptory challenges,
and whether the trial court erred in ultimately finding that
the challenges were not racially motivated.
Adequacy of the State's Rebuttal.
Despite the burden shifting under the prima facie
showing rules just described, the burden of showing racial
discrimination in a prosecutor's use of peremptory juror
challenges remains on the defendant. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
Therefore, once the prosecutor gives race-neutral reasons,
related to the case, for the peremptory challenges,*® it is
proper, as was done here, to allow the defendant to attack the
credibility of those reasons. In the end, however, the trial
court's finding on whether the challenges were racially
motivated turns largely on credibility, and is entitled to
great deference on review. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21; £an£ll
XI, 778 P.2d at 518; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
In asserting that the objected-to peremptory challenges
were gender-based rather than racially motivated, the
prosecutor failed to give race-neutral and case-related reasons
for striking the Hispanic women, instead of other women, from
the jury. The prosecutor's explanation that he simply liked
the Hispanics less than the other potential female jurors, "for
whatever reason," amounted to no more than an unsupported
denial of racial discrimination, and was a legally inadequate
10. w[W]e emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not
rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause.- Batson. 476 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted).

rebuttal. See Batson. 476 U.S. at 98 (prosecutor cannot rebut
allegation of improper discrimination merely by denying
discriminatory motive). 1
However, even though the State's rebuttal of Harrison's
allegation was inadequate, we do not believe that we are
compelled to find clear error in the trial court's conclusion
that the peremptory challenges were not racially motivated. We
have already noted Harrison's failure to raise a prima facie
case of improper peremptory challenges. Although the question
of whether a prima facie case was made became irrelevant when
the State offered reasons for its peremptory challenges, it
remained proper for the court to consider all relevant facts
and circumstances surrounding the State's peremptory challenges
in ultimately determining whether they had been racially
motivated. The absence of a pattern of minority strikes
supported the trial court's finding that the strikes were not
racially motivated. Indeed, in ruling on Harrison's objection,
the court noted that at least one juror of apparent minority
origin remained on the jury. Additionally, the court was free
to accept as credible the prosecutor's assertion that the
challenges were made in an effort to obtain a gender-balanced
jury. Therefore, there was no clear error in finding that the
State's peremptory challenges were not racially motivated.
Harrison claims, however, that in responding to his
federal equal protection objection to the State's peremptory
challenges, the State effectively admitted violating Utah Code
II. While failing to specify why he challenged the
Hispanic-surnamed women, the prosecutor actually gave a
race-neutral and case-related reason that he could have used to
justify a challenge to the other female, potentially Hispanic
juror whom he actually left on the jury. He admitted to having
been "a little bit worried" about this juror, who had a cousin
who had been accused of murder. This kind of concern has been
accepted in Batson-type objections to peremptory challenges.

£££, e.g./ United States v. vaccaro/ 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th
Cir. 1987) (juror had brother convicted of robbery). For other
examples of peremptory challenge reasons that have been held
adequate, see United States v. Anaiulo. 847 F.2d 956, 985 n.37
(1st Cir. 1988); People v. Tallev, 152 111. App. 3d 971, 105
III. Dec. 800, 504 N.E.2d 1318, 1327 (App. 4 Dist. 1987);
Townsend v. State. 730 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. App. 1987); Gradv v.
Siitfi/ 730 S.W.2d 191, 194-95 (Tex. App. 1987); Chambers -v.
State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. App. 1987).

Ann. § 78-46-3 (1987), which prohibits a citizen's exclusion
from jury service on account of gender.*2 He also asserts
that the State ran afoul o£ article IV, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution, which states: -The rights of citizens of the
State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of
this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and
religious rights and privileges.Harrison's objection to the gender basis of the State's
peremptory challenges was not raised in the trial court.
Because this objection includes a constitutional basis, we
could consider it for the first time on appeal if we were to
find that it has an impact on Harrison's liberty. State v.
Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990); Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However,
because this case involves neither plain error, Anderson, 789
P.2d at 29, nor exceptional circumstances, Jolivet v. Cook, 784
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989), cert, dfiflisd,
U.S.
, 110
S.Ct. 751 (1990), and does not impact Harrison's liberty, we
decline to consider it now. 13
12. -A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury
service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, or economic status.- Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 (1987).
We note that this section might operate to limit, upon timely
objection, some reasons for the exercise for peremptory
challenges that have been otherwise approved. See, e.g.,
Chambers, supra note 11 (membership in -fringe- or
-non-mainstream- religion); Grady, supra note 11 (juror had
held current job only one year).
13. We note a recent Utah Supreme Court opinion suggesting
that when a constitutional question involving liberty is
presented, the appellate court is -obliged- to consider it even
though it was not raised in the trial court. State v. Jameson,
146 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (1990). This -obligation- has not been
evident in previous cases where Utah's appellate courts have
refused to entertain constitutional challenges to criminal
convictions, with incarceration (and therefore liberty) at
stake, when those challenges had not been raised below. £as,
e.g., Jolivet (sentence challenged as cruel and unusual
punishment); State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)
(claiming due process violation); State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676
(Utah 1982) (per curiam) (claiming violation of state

In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court declined to consider
a constitutional objection to a criminal sentence that had not
been raised in the trial court, because the claimed error did
not satisfy the "obviousness- requirement for plain error, 789
P.2d at 29. 1 4 That is, the alleged error was not one that
should have been recognized by the trial court when it
occurred. Id. Here, given that Harrison's trial jury had five
women, the use of peremptory challenges to keep additional
women from being seated could not have been obvious error. Nor
has it been determined by Utah courts whether gender-based
peremptory challenges are constitutionally or statutorily
impermissible, so permitting such challenges was not obvious
error. See Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655 (declining to express
(Footnote 13 continued)
constitutional right to not give evidence against self); State
v. Winoer, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971) (claiming
violation of fifth amendment right to silence); State v. Webb,
790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (claimed fourth amendment
violation); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(claimed violation of federal and state constitutional
prohibitions against unreasonable arrest) . We believe that
"the interest of predictability, accountability, and fairnesswould be served by a more careful examination of when Utah's
appellate courts will consider issues not raised in the trial
courts. Espinal v. Salt Lake Citv Bd. of E d u c , 797 P.2d 412,
415-16 (Utah 1990) (Bench, Court of Appeals Judge,
concurring) . We further believe that the previously enunciated
standards allowing first-time appellate review of issues are
sufficiently liberal to provide appropriate redress, and are
therefore troubled by a standard requiring review whenever a
-liberty- interest is identified.
In Espinal, Judge Bench urged a standard requiring both
a liberty interest and exceptional circumstances before
addressing constitutional issues raised for the first time on
appeal. That suggested standard was not adopted in Jameson,
where a liberty interest alone was apparently found sufficient
to allow review. In this case, we do not find a liberty
interest at stake because of the remoteness of the gender bias
issue to Harrison's main claim of improper racial motivation.
Sfifi ilia note 15, infra. The issue, as presented, has more to
do with the public interest in a fair justice system than it
does with Harrison's liberty.
14. The other requirement for plain error is that the error be
harmful. Anderson. 789 P.2d at 29.

view on appropriateness of gender-based peremptory
challenges). 15
The Jolivet court did not articulate the meaning of
-exceptional circumstances.- However, in State v. Webb. 790
P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this court indicated that
exceptional circumstances are those which would explain and
excuse a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial
court- Xd. at 78. Here, as with the appellant in Webb, we
find "nothing in the record to suggest- that the gender
discrimination objection to the State's peremptory challenges
now raised by Harrison -was unknown or unavailable to him- at
trial. Xd. Absent such circumstances explaining Harrison's
failure to timely raise this objection, our entertaining it now
would encourage a practice of withholding objections to jury
selection until after an adverse verdict is returned, which we
have previously refused to do. See Carlston, 776 P.2d at
655-56.

PrejudiceBecause we have determined that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding no racial discrimination in the State's
peremptory challenges, we do not reach the issue of whether
Harrison was prejudiced by those challenges. However, if we
had found clear error, Harrison's conviction could be affirmed
only by showing that the error was -harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967) (quQtfifl in CantU I, 750 P.2d at 597). 1 6 This is a
difficult showing to make, and prosecutors
15. Because Harrison failed to show obvious error, we need not
consider whether he was harmed by the State's use of peremptory
challenges to limit the number of women on the jury. We
seriously doubt, however, that Harrison could demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had he been
tried by a jury including six or seven women, as opposed to
five.
16. The burden required to show harmless state constitutional
error is unsettled. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8
(Utah 1989). But £L*. State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah
1977) (federal and state constitutional error alleged:
reasonable doubt whether error was prejudicial should be
resolved in favor of defendant).

who are questioned in the future about possibly improper
peremptory juror challenges would do well to consider this in
formulating their responses, making sure that they meet the
Batson requirements.
As things stand here, Mr. Harrison is not entitled to a
new trial based upon the State's exercise of its peremptory
challenges in choosing the trial jury.
II.

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

We now turn to Harrison's contention that the exclusion
of evidence about the Crips firebombing and the trial court's
refusal to allow the reading of an adverse witness's allegedly
inconsistent prior testimony to the jury were improper.
On appeal, Harrison seeks to clothe these alleged errors
in constitutional garb, claiming they amounted to a deprivation
of his right to a fair trial. 17 However, he did not advance
constitutional arguments to the evidence exclusion in the trial
court. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the Utah Rules of
Evidence implicated by Harrison's arguments to the trial court.
In our analysis, we bear in mind the purposes for which
the excluded evidence was offered by Harrison. Both items
related to his contention that the shooting of Glover was
justified as self-defense. This justification would be
unavailable to Harrison if he were the aggressor in the
(Footnote 16 continued)
There is old authority suggesting that a conviction by an
illegally-constituted jury is null. Sfifi State v. Bates. 22
Utah 65, 61 P. 905 (1900) (conviction by eight-person jury
under state law, where alleged offense occurred before
statehood and therefore required trial before federally
mandated twelve-person jury, was null). If this standard
applied here, and Harrison's jury had been found to be
illegally selected, a new trial would apparently be required
regardless of any showing of prejudice.
17. Harrison invokes the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

PROSECUTORIAL VIOLATION OF MARITAL PRIVILEGE ISSUE

the diaper bag was permissible under the fourth amendment.
Consequently, there was no police illegality tainting the later
request for and grant of permission to search the bag at the
public safety building, when the gun was confiscated.30 The
denial of Harrison's fourth amendment-based suppression motion
was therefore appropriate.
We also believe that, under Harrison's defense theory,
admission of the pistol into evidence could not have prejudiced
him. Harrison admitted the shooting, claiming self-defense.
Admission of the pistol was therefore not the critical or sole
factor tying him to the shooting. Therefore, even if the
searches leading to police recovery of the pistol were
improper, under these circumstances there was no reasonable
likelihood of a different trial outcome had the gun been
suppressed. 1
IV.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Harrison presents a laundry list of instances of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. We consider only those instances to
which timely objection was made by Harrison at trial and which,
in the exercise of our discretion, warrant addressing in this
written opinion. State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah
1989). The issues of concern here are whether Harrison was
prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks about Harrison's
exercise of the marital privilege, and whether the prosecutor
violated Harrison's right against self-incrimination.

Marital PrivilegeBefore trial, the State agreed that Harrison's wife
would be barred from testifying under the marital privilege
30.
Indeed, it appears that no consent was necessary, because
under our analysis the police could have confiscated the gun at
the arrest scene.
31.
According to the record, Harrison's weapon was a
relatively small, .25 caliber pistol. Admission of this type
of weapon would not necessarily be inconsistent with Harrison's
claim of self-defense. Prejudice would be more likely, of
course, if the weapon were, for example, a shotgun, assault
rifle, or other weapon not generally associated with private
citizens seeking to protect themselves while out in public.

statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1) (1987). 32 A jury
instruction incorporating the state constitutional version of
the marital privilege was commented upon by the prosecutor in
closing argument as follows:
Instruction No. 10.
interesting one.

This is a very

A married person may not be forced to
testify in any criminal action against their
spouse.
What's the assistance of that? Well,
there is a preliminary hearing of this matter
on the 17th of May and the defendant gets
married in July. And the trial is in August,

Isn't it interesting that one of the two
people who got told about the oun in

fGlpversI wgjstband is the wife who canlt
testify?
(Emphasis added.) The comment ultimately attacked Harrison's
trial testimony that Glover had been armed, an assertion he
never made, at least to prosecutors or police, until trial.
Harrison testified that he had not been completely silent about
32.

Section 78-24-8(1) (1987) reads, in pertinent part:
A husband cannot be examined for or against
his wife without her consent, nor a wife for
or against her husband without his consent;
nor can either during the marriage or
afterwards be, without the consent of the
other, examined as to any communication made
by one to the other during the marriage . . . .

The current version of the statute appears to limit the
scope of the statutory privilege only to marital
communications: "Neither a wife nor a husband may either during
the marriage or afterwards be, without the consent of the
other, examined as to any communication made by one to the
other during the marriage.- Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1)(a)
(Supp. 1990). However, article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution provides, without limitation, that "a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife . . . ."

Glover's alleged gun before trial, claiming that he had told his
wife and the wife of one of his companions about this shortly
after the shooting. The companion's wife could not be located for
trial,
Harrison objected to the prosecutor's comment on his
exercise of the marital privilege, but the trial court overruled
the objection. On appeal, the State correctly concedes that the
prosecutor's comment was improper. Ss& State v. Brown. 14 Utah 2d
324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963). The State argues, however, that the
comment was harmless error.
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), sets
forth a two part test for assessing whether improper counsel
comments in a criminal case are harmless or warrant reversal.
Such comments warrant reversal if (1) they call juror attention to
matters which should not be considered in reaching a verdict; and
(2) under the circumstances of the particular case, the jurors
were probably influenced by the comments. 513 P.2d at 426. 33 We
equate the second part of this test with our usual standard for
reversible error: reversal is required where there is a reasonable
likelihood that, absent the error, defendant would have received a
more favorable verdict. State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 34
33. We consider the two part Valdez test to effectively supersede
Brown. In Brown, appellant's rape conviction was reversed because
of improper prosecutor comments on defendant's marital privilege
without consideration of whether those comments were actually
prejudicial and, indeed, despite the fact that the evidence in the
case supported the conviction. The absence of a prejudice
analysis in Brown was later criticized. See State v. Trustv. 28
Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113, 115 (1972) (Ellett, J., concurring).
Part two of the Valdez analysis addresses the prejudice issue
overlooked in Brown.
34. We are aware of language in other cases suggesting that where
a prosecutor's comment has the effect of destroying a privilege by
inviting the jury to draw an adverse inference from its exercise,
a conviction should be readily reversed. For example, in Trusty.
the Utah Supreme Court stated that such a comment warrants a new
trial if there is "a possibility that it prejudiced the defendant,
in the sense that there is any likelihood that there may have been
a different result . . . ." 502 P.2d at 114 (emphasis added).

Part one of the Valdez test is satisfied here- The
prosecutor's comment invited the jury to infer that Harrison
used the marital privilege to hide relevant information.
Indeed, it is apparent that the jury was also invited to infer
that Harrison married his wife to prevent her from testifying.
Neither inference should have been considered by the jury in
reaching its verdict.
In applying part two of the Valdez test/ it is
appropriate to compare the likely impact of the improper
prosecutor comment with other evidence of Harrison's guilt.
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). We also look at
the comment in relation to evidence that might absolve
Harrison. Specifically, would the jury have been more likely
to acquit Harrison, based on his self-defense claim, if the
improper comment had not been made?
The comment attacked, in a roundabout manner, Harrison's
testimony that Glover had been armed with a gun. The
allegation that Glover was armed was stressed in Harrison's
(Footnote 34 continued)
Later in the same opinion, however, the court indicated that it
was applying a test of -whether in surveying the total
circumstances it appears that there is any reasonable
likelihood of any substantial prejudice to the defendant . . . .*
X&. at 115 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in State v. Eaton. 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977),
addressing a prosecutor's improper comment on the defendant's
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, our
supreme court stated: w[W]e believe that, on appeal, when there
is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was
prejudicial, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the
defendant.- I£. at 1116. The same passage, however, indicated
that the threshold for reversal for such a comment would be "a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there may have been a
different result . . . ." Id. Eaton was later cited to
support the latter standard for reversal, in a case where a
wife testified for the State over the defendant husband's
objection. See State v. Bundv, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984).
It appears, therefore, that in order to reconcile the slight
semantic difference, a determination of a reasonable likelihood
of a different result should subsume the notion that any doubts
as to prejudice are to be resolved in favor of an accused. See
Slfifl Chaoman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967) (-little,
if any- difference exists between the two standards).

trial defense. •* In response, the prosecutor impeached
Harrison's testimony by eliciting his admission that he had not
told police or prosecutors about Glover's gun until trial.
The testimony of Terron Horton, the only other witness claiming
to have possibly seen Glover's gun, was impeached on the basis
of his not having reported it in his initial statement to
investigators. No gun was recovered from Glover, and no other
witness reported that Glover had a gun at any time on the night
of the shooting. The jury thus had ample reason to reject the
assertion that Glover had been armed, quite apart from any
impact the prosecutor's comment may have had. Accordingly, we
see no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable verdict had
the comment not been made. The comment was, therefore,
harmless error.

Self-incrimination*
Harrison contends that the following comment in the
prosecutor's closing argument was an improper use of his
post-arrest silence against him:
The most incredible story, the added detail of
the chrome plated revolver that he saw so well
from a distance of fifteen feet sticking out
of the waistband of the dead man. Waistband?
Waistband? On a dark end street with some
back lit things from the Persepolis
restaurant? He's so sure he saw that that
he's willing to kill a man. No, that's an
added detail. He made that up later. He
never tells anybody about that.
The trial court overruled Harrison's objection that this was an
improper comment on his post-arrest silence, holding that
Harrison had waived his right to remain silent by testifying,
and that the comment was simply one on the credibility of his
testimony. Earlier cross-examination questions relating to
Harrison's failure to report Glover's "chrome gun" before trial
had also elicited objections.
The challenged questions and argument were, again, part
of the prosecutor's efforts to impeach Harrison's claim that
35. The allegation was not, however, critical to Harrison's
self-defense claim. The jury was instructed that apparent
peril, without actual peril, could support a self-defense
claim. Thus Harrison's belief that Glover had a gun, if
reasonable, could have supported the self-defense theory.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE

reveals lengthy and labyrinthine questioning of Bray, both at
trial and at the preliminary hearing, on just what Harrison
said, and when, regarding whether he left the Persepolis to get
his gun after the initial confrontation with Glover and
company. The trial court painstakingly examined Bray's
testimony, considering his responses in the context of the
questioning. Its finding that the preliminary hearing
testimony was not inconsistent with Bray's trial testimony is
not clearly erroneous, so we leave that finding undisturbed.
The trial court's exclusion of Bray's preliminary
hearing testimony would have also been proper under Utah R.
Evid. 403, which permits the exclusion of evidence when "its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Valid
considerations of confusion and waste of time were present
here. We can affirm the trial court's ruling on this proper
alternative ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah
1985). 2 4 Finally, as noted regarding exclusion of the
firebombing incident, there is no indication that admission of
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been reasonably
likely to result in a more favorable trial outcome for Harrison.
III.

SEARCH OF DIAPER BAG

Harrison's third claimed error is that the search of the
diaper bag, where his gun was found, violated his rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, and, therefore, the
gun should not have been admitted into evidence. Harrison
cites both the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution art. I, § 14, but does
not argue that the two provisions should be construed
differently. Our analysis is therefore limited to the fourth
amendment.
The trial court found that the diaper bag was under the
principal custody and control of Harrison's wife, and that Mrs.
Harrison freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the
24. See also Utah R. Evid. 611(a) (trial court to reasonably
control evidence presentation for purposes of effective
truthfinding, avoiding waste of time, and protecting witnesses
from harassment).

bag. We do not overturn fact findings underlying a decision to
suppress or admit evidence unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Legal conclusions based on those findings, however, are
reviewed on a nondeferential, correction of error basis. Id.

Custody and Control*
Evidence in the suppression hearing showed that Harrison
was living apart from his wife and children at the time of the
arrest, so there is no clear error in finding that the diaper
bag was primarily under Mrs. Harrison's custody and control.
However, the trial court did not state the legal conclusion it
drew from this finding.
The State invites us to infer that the finding
represents a conclusion that Harrison lacked standing to
challenge the search. Such a conclusion lacks legal support.
In Minnesota v. Olson,
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court held that an overnight houseguest
had a sufficient privacy interest in the occupied premises to
challenge his warrantless arrest therein. The Harrisons
testified at the suppression hearing that when they were
together with the children, both had access to the diaper bag
for child care purposes. As with the homeowner and her guest
in Qlsfin, 1 1 0 S.Ct. at 1689, Mrs. Harrison's ultimate ownership
of and control over the diaper bag was not inconsistent with
Harrison also having a legitimate privacy expectation in it.
Therefore, Harrison had standing to challenge the search.
The finding that Mrs. Harrison had custody and control
of the diaper bag also meant that she had authority to consent
to its search, and that separate consent from Harrison was
unnecessary. It is quite clear that either party sharing joint
use of property can, under the fourth amendment, give valid
consent to a search of that property. Frazier v. C U D D . 394
U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (consent to search defendant's duffel bag
was binding on defendant when given by co-user of bag).
Therefore, Mrs. Harrison's consent, if valid, was sufficient to
permit the search.
Validity of Mrs. Harrison's Consent.
A warrantless search is per se improper under the fourth
amendment unless a specific exception applies. Katz v. United
SlLaiSi, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d
684, 687 (Utah 1990). The State has the burden of showing that
such an exception, in this case valid consent to the search,
applies. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687.

Consent to search the diaper bag was obtained from Mrs,
Harrison following her arrest, at the public safety building
where she had been taken for questioning.^5 Harrison does not
contest the trial court's finding that this consent was freely
and voluntarily given. However, this finding, by itself, does
not support a conclusion that the consent was valid.
In Arroyo, the Utah Supreme Court held that, for a
consent to a search to be valid, the consent must be
voluntarily given and not obtained by exploitation of prior
illegal police conduct. 796 P.2d at 688. In essence, as
applied here, the second part of this test is necessary to
deter police from using illegal means to uncover reasons to
seek consent for a search. -Police should not be permitted to
ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a
[voluntary] consent after the illegality has occurred.- Id. at
689.
At the suppression hearing, Mrs. Harrison testified that
she consented to the diaper bag search because she had seen a
police officer search the bag and find the gun earlier, at the
arrest scene. She believed that withholding her consent after
the fact would be futile, akin to closing the barn door after
the horses have escaped. The detective who sought her consent
testified that he did so based on an arresting officer's report
that the diaper bag appeared to contain a gun. Therefore both
the request for and the grant of Mrs. Harrison's consent to
search the bag at the public safety building were prompted by
police conduct at the arrest scene. If that conduct was
illegal, Mrs. Harrison's consent was probably invalid.
The trial court never entered a specific finding related
to the legality of police handling of the diaper bag at the
arrest scene. ° The burden was on the State to justify any
25. The record does not reveal the crime for which Mrs.
Harrison was arrested. Harrison, however, does not contend
that his wife's arrest was illegal. Therefore, we presume her
arrest was proper.
26. We have recently indicated our approval of the practice in
many jurisdictions of requiring specific fact findings to
support a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, gee
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Where specific findings are required, failure to enter such
findings is reversible error unless the facts in the record

search of the diaper bag. Harrison argues that the diaper bag
was illegally searched at the arrest scene. 27 The State
argues that the arrest scene search of the diaper bag was legal
because it was incident to the Harrisons' arrest.
A contemporaneous, warrantless search of the area within
an arrestee's immediate control is permissible for the purpose
of recovering weapons the arrestee might reach, or to prevent
concealment or destruction of evidence of the crime. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); State v. Harris. 671 P.2d
175, 180 (Utah 1983). Both justifications were present here.
Police sought Harrison because they believed that he had been
involved in Glover's shooting. Upon finding and arresting
Harrison, it was reasonable for police to believe that he might
have a gun within his control, and that the gun might be
evidence of a crime.
The area of "immediate control- can extend to a closed
container left in the passenger area of a car, even after the
arrestee has been moved away from the car. New York v. Bel ton.
453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981). See also State v. Houser. 669 P.2d
437, 440 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (search of arrestee's
backpack permissible); State v. Kent. 665 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah
1983) (search of passenger area of car permissible where
arrestee was handcuffed and lying on ground next to car); In re
K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981) (per curiam) (search of
pickup cab and bed, including unlocked container therein,
permissible although arrestee removed from truck).
(Footnote 26 continued)
-are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Bauah. 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983). Because the Utah Supreme Court had not
issued its Arroyo opinion while Harrison's case was before the
trial court, it may not have been clear to the trial court that
findings on both voluntariness and the legality of prior police
conduct were needed for consent to a warrantless search to be
valid. We therefore examine the record in this case to see if
the facts on record support a conclusion that police conduct at
the arrest scene was legal.
27. As noted earlier, there is dispute over whether the diaper
bag was fully searched at the arrest scene or simply -patted
down." If a full search of the bag was proper incident to the
arrest, this dispute becomes meaningless. Therefore for our
analysis we will accept as true Mrs. Harrison's assertion that
the bag was fully searched.

In this case, the Harrisons were ordered to the ground
and searched by arresting police. The record indicates that
the baby stroller and diaper bag were approximately ten feet
away from them at this time- This distance, coupled with the
fact that the Harrisons were individually guarded, raises doubt
that the diaper bag was in either of the Harrisons* immediate
control, in terms of either of them being able to reach into it
before officers could intervene.2° However, the arrestees in
Belton. Houser, Kent/ and KtK,C>, supra, were similarly removed
from the searched areas, and those searches were upheld. 9
Here, the diaper bag was sufficiently within the Harrisons*
immediate control, as that term has been construed, to permit
its search incident to their arrest.
A separate safety concern also justified searching the
diaper bag at the arrest scene. Even if the bag were outside
any realistic control by the Harrisons, there was no way to
secure it at the scene pending the obtaining of a warrant to
search it. The bag, stroller, and babies were going to be
moved. Additionally, babies being babies, somebody would need
to get into the bag before long. If that somebody were Mrs.
Harrison, it was reasonable to ensure there was no weapon in
the bag that she might obtain or hide. It was also reasonable
to protect anyone else who might move or get into the bag for
baby care against the possible existence and accidental
discharge of a loaded weapon within.
Concerns both for safety and preservation of evidence
were present, and under applicable case law the diaper bag was
sufficiently within the Harrisons' control to allow its
search. We hold, therefore, that the arrest scene search of
28. Additionally, the record reveals that Mr. Harrison was
handcuffed and was taken away in a patrol car just before the
diaper bag was searched.
29. In Belton, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of
workably defining the area within an arrestee's immediate
control. In the context of the search of the passenger area of
a car from which the arrestee has been removed, the Court noted
that such an area is one into which "generally, even if not
inevitably," the arrestee might reach. 453 U.S. at 460.
Police restraint and physical removal of the arrestee, then,
while limiting the arrestee's ability to actually reach into a
particular area, does not automatically prohibit police from
searching that area.

the diaper bag was permissible under the fourth amendment.
Consequently, there was no police illegality tainting the later
request for and grant of permission to search the bag at the
public safety building, when the gun was confiscated.30 The
denial of Harrison's fourth amendment-based suppression motion
was therefore appropriate.
We also believe that, under Harrison's defense theory,
admission of the pistol into evidence could not have prejudiced
him. Harrison admitted the shooting, claiming self-defense.
Admission of the pistol was therefore not the critical or sole
factor tying him to the shooting. Therefore, even if the
searches leading to police recovery of the pistol were
improper, under these circumstances there was no reasonable
likelihood of a different trial outcome had the gun been
suppressed.31
IV.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Harrison presents a laundry list of instances of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. We consider only those instances to
which timely objection was made by Harrison at trial and which,
in the exercise of our discretion, warrant addressing in this
written opinion. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah
1989). The issues of concern here are whether Harrison was
prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks about Harrison's
exercise of the marital privilege, and whether the prosecutor
violated Harrison's right against self-incrimination.

Marital PrivilegeBefore trial, the State agreed that Harrison's wife
would be barred from testifying under the marital privilege
30. Indeed, it appears that no consent was necessary, because
under our analysis the police could have confiscated the gun at
the arrest scene.
31. According to the record, Harrison's weapon was a
relatively small, .25 caliber pistol. Admission of this type
of weapon would not necessarily be inconsistent with Harrison's
claim of self-defense. Prejudice would be more likely, of
course, if the weapon were, for example, a shotgun, assault
rifle, or other weapon not generally associated with private
citizens seeking to protect themselves while out in public.

APPENDIX 2

SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the

United States and the Constitution of this State; that I will discharge the duties of attorney and

counselor at law as an officer of the courts of this State with honesty andfidelity;and that I will

strictly observe the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah, so help me God.

State of Utah
County of Salt Lake

ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of

, 19

Clerk, Supreme Court of Utah

Constitution of Utah, Article IV section 1
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and
hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex. Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy
equally all civil, political and religious rights and
privileges.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-3
A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury
service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, or economic status.
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause;
(b) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused
has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for
obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity
to obtain counsel;
(c) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a
waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a
preliminary hearing;
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense all
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility
by a protective order of the tribunal; and
(e) Exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators,
law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons
assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case
from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor
would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6.

APPENDIX 3

For examples of cases demonstrating that harmless error
analysis does not apply to illegal jury selection, see e.g.
Commonwealth v. Soares. 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979)
(peremptory challenge exercised on basis of group bias
per se reversible error), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 881
(1979);
State v. Madison. 213 A.2d 880 (Md. 1965)(if grand jury is
selected in illegal manner, no prejudice need be shown to
justify dismissal of indictment);
United States v. De Gross. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.
1990)(conviction reversed on basis of improper peremptory
challenge without harmless error analysis);
Gray v. Mississippi. 481 U.S. 648 (1987)(harmless error
analysis does not apply when juror in capital case
improperly excused for cause on basis of opposition to
capital punishment);
Rose v. Mitchell. 443 U.S. 545 (1979)(racial discrimination
in grand jury selection requires reversal of conviction
without harmless error analysis);
Vasquez v. Hillery. 474 U.S. 254 (1986)(systematic
exclusion of blacks from grand jury system requires
reversal of conviction without harmless error analysis);
Alvarado v. United States. 497 U.S.
, 111 L.Ed.2d 439,
110 S.Ct.
(1990)(case remanded to lower court for
reevaluation in light of solicitor general's concession
that claim of Batson error was not mollified by fact that
actual jury selected comported with sixth amendment
standards).

